Publications
2020
Aesthetic Hedonism and Its Critics, Philosophy Compass, 15(1): e12645.
The standard theory of aesthetic value in post-war analytic aesthetics––sometimes called "experientialism" or "value empiricism"––is at base a form of hedonism. Across all its variations, it posits a constitutive link between an item's aesthetic value(s) and some finally valuable experience(s) of the item. Until relatively recently, aesthetic hedonism has gone virtually without challenge and, as a result, much research in aesthetics proceeds against a backdrop of hedonist assumptions. In this paper I review the main arguments against hedonism in recent print and contend that, taken together, although not necessarily conclusive, they provide us with presumptive reason to prefer alternatives. I suggest some promising directions to explore, and point out indicators that a new anti-hedonist research programme is already under way. [penultimate draft available here]
2019
The Motivational Structure of Appreciation, Philosophical Quarterly, 69(276): 445–466.
The aesthetic attitude theorists believed that appreciative engagement requires a distinctive, non-instrumental mode of attention. George Dickie famously criticized their view in his "Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude", but despite broad initial uptake of his criticisms, allusions to the attitude theorists' notion of "attention for its own sake" are still commonplace in aesthetics. I develop a new account of this appreciative mode of attending by drawing an analogy with a peculiar mode of game play foregrounded in Thi Nguyen's recent work in the philosophy of games. My account evades Dickie's main concerns and, while it breaks with many of the attitude theorists' central commitments, retains the spirit of their view. [penultimate draft available here]
2012
Towards defending a semantic theory of expression in art: revisiting Goodman, South African Journal of Philosophy, 31(3): 600–612.
This paper articulates a version of Nelson Goodman's theory of artefact expression that is independent of Goodman's commitments to metaphysical nominalism and a conventionalist account of linguistic meaning. The proposal grounds our attributions of expressive properties to artefacts in an audience or receiver's recognition of a communicative intention that the artefact should exemplify features of the emotion expressed.
Aesthetic Hedonism and Its Critics, Philosophy Compass, 15(1): e12645.
The standard theory of aesthetic value in post-war analytic aesthetics––sometimes called "experientialism" or "value empiricism"––is at base a form of hedonism. Across all its variations, it posits a constitutive link between an item's aesthetic value(s) and some finally valuable experience(s) of the item. Until relatively recently, aesthetic hedonism has gone virtually without challenge and, as a result, much research in aesthetics proceeds against a backdrop of hedonist assumptions. In this paper I review the main arguments against hedonism in recent print and contend that, taken together, although not necessarily conclusive, they provide us with presumptive reason to prefer alternatives. I suggest some promising directions to explore, and point out indicators that a new anti-hedonist research programme is already under way. [penultimate draft available here]
2019
The Motivational Structure of Appreciation, Philosophical Quarterly, 69(276): 445–466.
The aesthetic attitude theorists believed that appreciative engagement requires a distinctive, non-instrumental mode of attention. George Dickie famously criticized their view in his "Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude", but despite broad initial uptake of his criticisms, allusions to the attitude theorists' notion of "attention for its own sake" are still commonplace in aesthetics. I develop a new account of this appreciative mode of attending by drawing an analogy with a peculiar mode of game play foregrounded in Thi Nguyen's recent work in the philosophy of games. My account evades Dickie's main concerns and, while it breaks with many of the attitude theorists' central commitments, retains the spirit of their view. [penultimate draft available here]
2012
Towards defending a semantic theory of expression in art: revisiting Goodman, South African Journal of Philosophy, 31(3): 600–612.
This paper articulates a version of Nelson Goodman's theory of artefact expression that is independent of Goodman's commitments to metaphysical nominalism and a conventionalist account of linguistic meaning. The proposal grounds our attributions of expressive properties to artefacts in an audience or receiver's recognition of a communicative intention that the artefact should exemplify features of the emotion expressed.
Book Reviews
2020
Review of McMahon, Jennifer A. (ed), Social Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: Pleasure Reflection and Accountability, British Journal of Aesthetics, 60(1): 92–95. [penultimate draft available here]
Review of McMahon, Jennifer A. (ed), Social Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: Pleasure Reflection and Accountability, British Journal of Aesthetics, 60(1): 92–95. [penultimate draft available here]
Work in Progress
(contact me for drafts)
(contact me for drafts)
Appreciation as Metacognition
In this paper I argue that our theorizing about aesthetic experience and appreciation should be informed from the outset by empirical work on metacognition. Philosophers working on appreciation often appeal to second-order mental phenomena, but their appeals cannot rise above the speculative until we better understand the place (and limits) of our metacognitive capacities in our mental lives in general. I review two sets of work on metacognition, from social psychology and cognitive science respectively, and use this work to develop a hypothesis about the role of second-order thought in appreciative engagement. [draft available on request]
In this paper I argue that our theorizing about aesthetic experience and appreciation should be informed from the outset by empirical work on metacognition. Philosophers working on appreciation often appeal to second-order mental phenomena, but their appeals cannot rise above the speculative until we better understand the place (and limits) of our metacognitive capacities in our mental lives in general. I review two sets of work on metacognition, from social psychology and cognitive science respectively, and use this work to develop a hypothesis about the role of second-order thought in appreciative engagement. [draft available on request]
Presentations
Upcoming
April, 2021, Comments on Zachary Weinstein's "Striving to Appreciate"
American Society for Aesthetics, Pacific Division Meeting (moved online due to Covid-19 pandemic)
American Society for Aesthetics, Pacific Division Meeting (moved online due to Covid-19 pandemic)
Recent
2020
16 September, Against an Immoderate Immediacy Thesis in Aesthetics
Higher Seminar in Aesthetics, Uppsala University, Sweden (moved online due to Covid-19 pandemic)
12 November, Comments on Brandon Polite's "Epistemic Humility and the Limits of Aesthetic Autonomy"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Washington DC (moved online due to Covid-19 pandemic)
2019
10 October, Comments on Nathan Smith's "In Support of Value Empiricism in Aesthetics"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ
10 May, Against an Immoderate Immediacy Thesis in Aesthetics
Salish Sea Aesthetics Workshop, co-sponsored by UBC and the American Society for Aesthetics, Vancouver, Canada
17 April, Motivational Inversion in Appreciation
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, Vancouver, Canada
2018
13 October, Comments on Errol Lord's "The Nature of Perceptual Experience and the Rationality of Criticism"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada
Lord's paper has since been accpeted for publication in Ergo (a penultimate draft of his paper is available here, and a copy of my comments here).
26 September, Appreciation and Non-Instrumental Motivation
Higher Seminar in Aesthetics, Uppsala University, Sweden
22 September, Striving Play and the Appreciative Motivational Profile
British Society for Aesthetics Annual Conference, St. Anne's College, Oxford, UK
10 August, Appreciation as Process
Camp Aesthetics, Capitol Reef Field Station, Utah Valley University
2017
17 November, Comments on Robert Hopkins' "Awareness of Things in Pictures is Unique"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA
9 June, How it Happens: A Process-First Approach to Appreciation
Nordic Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Bergen, Norway
25 May, Appreciation and Metacognition (winner of the Fabian Dorsch Essay Prize)
European Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference, Free University, Berlin, Germany
2016
19 November, Value Empiricism and a Broad Conception of Experience
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA
17 September, Value Empiricism and a Broad Conception of Experience
British Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, St. Anne's College, Oxford, UK
2014
31 October, Comments on John Kulvicki's "Analog Representation and Structure Preservation"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, San Antonio, TX
Kulvicki's paper has since been published in the Review of Philosophy and Psychology as "Analog Representation and the Parts Principle". A copy of my comments at the conference is available here.
16 September, Against an Immoderate Immediacy Thesis in Aesthetics
Higher Seminar in Aesthetics, Uppsala University, Sweden (moved online due to Covid-19 pandemic)
12 November, Comments on Brandon Polite's "Epistemic Humility and the Limits of Aesthetic Autonomy"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Washington DC (moved online due to Covid-19 pandemic)
2019
10 October, Comments on Nathan Smith's "In Support of Value Empiricism in Aesthetics"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ
10 May, Against an Immoderate Immediacy Thesis in Aesthetics
Salish Sea Aesthetics Workshop, co-sponsored by UBC and the American Society for Aesthetics, Vancouver, Canada
17 April, Motivational Inversion in Appreciation
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, Vancouver, Canada
2018
13 October, Comments on Errol Lord's "The Nature of Perceptual Experience and the Rationality of Criticism"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada
Lord's paper has since been accpeted for publication in Ergo (a penultimate draft of his paper is available here, and a copy of my comments here).
26 September, Appreciation and Non-Instrumental Motivation
Higher Seminar in Aesthetics, Uppsala University, Sweden
22 September, Striving Play and the Appreciative Motivational Profile
British Society for Aesthetics Annual Conference, St. Anne's College, Oxford, UK
10 August, Appreciation as Process
Camp Aesthetics, Capitol Reef Field Station, Utah Valley University
2017
17 November, Comments on Robert Hopkins' "Awareness of Things in Pictures is Unique"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA
9 June, How it Happens: A Process-First Approach to Appreciation
Nordic Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Bergen, Norway
25 May, Appreciation and Metacognition (winner of the Fabian Dorsch Essay Prize)
European Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference, Free University, Berlin, Germany
2016
19 November, Value Empiricism and a Broad Conception of Experience
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA
17 September, Value Empiricism and a Broad Conception of Experience
British Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, St. Anne's College, Oxford, UK
2014
31 October, Comments on John Kulvicki's "Analog Representation and Structure Preservation"
American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, San Antonio, TX
Kulvicki's paper has since been published in the Review of Philosophy and Psychology as "Analog Representation and the Parts Principle". A copy of my comments at the conference is available here.